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The United States sprung onto the world stage at the turn of the twentieth century, join-
ing the ranks of the European imperial powers. Two events catalyzed this evolution, 
both occurring in the Caribbean. The outcome of the Spanish-American War proved the 
first, with direct possession of Puerto Rico and other territories, as well as virtual control 
over Cuba as a protectorate. Soon thereafter, primarily associated with President William 
Howard Taft, Dollar Diplomacy provided a vehicle for U.S. sovereignty over the Do-
minican Republic and other areas of the Caribbean, substituting “dollars for bullets.” 
The U.S. projected its power into these arenas, seeking to reshape and develop regional 
Latin American polities into capitalistic, democratic nations in the American image. This 
laboratory, experimenting with power and economic development, would forge new 
American foreign policy directions, its echoes today shaping contemporary nation-
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ism as right and just in his Senate speech 
of January 9, 1900. According to 
Beveridge, God made Americans politi-
cally adept so “that we may administer 
government among savage and senile 
peoples.”2 To prevent relapse into barba-
rism, then, Americans had been given a 
divine mission to “lead in the regenera-
tion of the world.”3  
 
Theodore Roosevelt concurred. The 
president-scholar perceived a “certain 
parallelism” regarding the fate of species 
and the affairs of men, i.e., development, 
change and dominance among those vari-
ous human groups “which form races or 
nations.” A barbaric race might gradually 
develop into a more complex civilization, 
just as in evolutionary biology generalized 
forms give rise to specialized forms. Roo-
sevelt perceived the question of how to 
deal with utterly alien peoples as the 
daunting challenge then facing empires in 
the new century. International duty, ac-
cording to the great powers, demanded 
control of other races—while, of course, 
safeguarding against the threat of barba-
rism—but only if managed “for the bene-
fit of the other race.”4  
 
Roosevelt and Beveridge, in a nutshell, 
expressed the turn-of-the-century civiliz-
ing mission embraced by the United 
States as the ebb and flow of international 
fortune presented the United States with 
a global empire, one anchored in the Car-
ibbean. Indeed, the pervasive appeal of 
such notions transcended political and 
popular ideas of international develop-
ment and peace, with Scientific American 
even noting Puerto Rico as unique, pos-
sessing “a large white population capable 
“Peace follows . . . the power of the mighty civi-
lized races which have not lost the fighting in-
stinct, and which by their expansion are gradu-
ally bringing peace into red wastes where the bar-
barian peoples of the world hold sway.” 
 
      Theodore Roosevelt (1899)1 
 
The lure of new global export markets, 
among other factors, drove the United 
States to seize the opportunity of the 
Maine’s sinking in Havana harbor, thrust-
ing America into the ranks of imperial 
nations. Republican Senator Albert J. 
Beveridge defended American imperial-
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Caribbean. In the 1890s, U.S. Naval Col-
lege president Captain Alfred Thayer 
Mahan succeeded where Seward had 
failed. Mahan argued that British global 
dominance emerged from its sea power 
and that the United States should con-
struct a strong navy to support the expan-
sion of American markets. Historian Fre-
derick Jackson Turner indirectly rein-
forced Mahan. His noted 1893 essay—
The Frontier Thesis—declared the final 
closing of the American frontier. Turner’s 
work implied that American economic 
expansion would now need to seek for-
eign outlets. No market lured more than 
the vast China market. Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt sup-
ported Mahan’s ideas and, in turn, Presi-
dent William McKinley’s reluctant war 
against Spain. By the time the dust had 
settled on the Spanish-American War, the 
U.S. sphere not only included its Carib-
bean possessions, but also a series of Pa-
cific coaling stations from Hawaii to 
Guam and the Philippines with which to 
reach the fabled China market.6 
 
Secretary of State John Hay recognized 
the weak position of the United States vis
-à-vis the European powers which had 
already staked claims in China where the 
Americans had none. Ostensibly as a 
measure to safeguard Chinese rights and 
sovereignty, Hay proposed an “Open 
Door” policy to guarantee equal trade and 
commerce opportunities in China. He se-
cured agreement from Japan, Russia and 
the European powers to this free, open 
market, the great powers resolving not to 
seize Chinese territories for the establish-
ment of new colonies. Hay had adroitly 
maneuvered a relatively weaker United 
of taking part in advancing civilization.”5    
 
New Economic Frontiers 
 
Economic considerations conjoined with 
the civilizing impetus to evolve new di-
rections in American international rela-
tions. During the nineteenth century the 
United States had witnessed Europeans 
carving up the world, the British, the 
French and the Germans in Africa, the 
French also in Indochina, and later the 
Japanese even expanding their power in 
Asia, with virtually all nations scrambling 
for a piece of China. The United States 
had catalyzed the emergence of the ulti-
mately imperialist Meiji regime with Com-
modore Matthew C. Perry’s mid-century, 
trade-oriented gunboat diplomacy; how-
ever, to project sustained power, Ameri-
cans sought to expand their navy. After 
the Confederate War, Secretary of State 
William Seward had pursued expansion of 
an American Pacific presence with the 
purchase of Alaska, and also argued un-
successfully for U.S. naval bases in the 
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The U.S. might desire stable Latin Ameri-
can nations capable of dutifully paying 
their debts to European investors, but 
civilizing mission or not, convincing 
American citizens to support new wars 
and bear the burden of more colonies 
would be untenable. President William 
Howard Taft (1909-1913) desired to re-
place “bullets with dollars,” invoking a 
new foreign policy of Dollar Diplomacy. 
Employing private loans, typically from 
Wall Street, to advance U.S. overseas in-
terests, these enhanced financial and busi-
ness opportunities worked hand-in-hand 
with diplomatic initiatives to press for fis-
cal and structural reform in Latin Amer-
ica. Dollar Diplomacy could be employed 
locally in the Caribbean, or to American 
interests around the world. Liberia en-
joyed such American attentions to pro-
mote rubber production for Harvey Fire-
stone and his company; similarly, in 
China, J. P. Morgan’s banking conglomer-
ate joined forces with a European consor-
tium to build a railroad from Huguang to 
Canton. Behind the scenes, the driving 
force behind Dollar Diplomacy proved to 
be none other than Philander C. Knox, 
founder of the giant firm U.S. Steel. This 
reflected the eliding of diplomacy and pri-
vate commerce in a re-ordering of inter-
national relations. Despite their hopes for 
this new policy, it would fail to stem revo-
lution in the Dominican Republic, Nica-
ragua, Mexico, and even China.9  
 
Dollar Diplomacy and Imperialism 
 
The standard narrative does not recognize 
imperialism as an aspect of Dollar Diplo-
States into a commercial presence in 
China. He did this without war and with-
out the inconvenience of direct coloniza-
tion, an important factor while the U.S. 
wrestled with how best to manage its new 
colonies, especially in the Caribbean.7 
Successive administrations would follow 
Hay’s free, open market approach as a 
matter of foreign policy. 
 
Holding Europe at Bay 
 
United States security interests shifted as 
prospects brightened for an inter-ocean 
canal, eventually located in Panama, driv-
ing American hegemonic interests in the 
region. European presence in the Carib-
bean needed to be minimized, either di-
rectly by naval force, or by threat of that 
force. Thus arose in 1904 President Roo-
sevelt’s “Big Stick,” an extension of the 
Monroe Doctrine that came to be known 
as the Roosevelt Corollary. In essence, to 
discourage European nations from inter-
vening in Latin America to collect 
debts—as had been threatened in Vene-
zuela and the Dominican Republic—
Roosevelt declared the U.S. as hemi-
spheric policeman. These constabulary 
powers would not be directed so much at 
the Europeans, but at any irresponsible 
Latin American powers, in the U.S. view, 
that would invite European aggression 
for not meeting international financial 
obligations. As a matter of duty, the 
United States would take whatever meas-
ures it deemed necessary to assure inter-
nal stability in such impotent nations. In 
practice, Roosevelt had created justifica-
tion for repeated military interventions 
into Latin American nations such as Cuba, 
Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Re-
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colonization; however, after 1898 the 
United States sought to extend its influ-
ence without further acquisition of terri-
tory. Historian Daniel Headrick perceives 
imperialism when a stronger state im-
poses its will on a weaker society by force, 
or the threat of force. That is, in a mod-
ern sense imperialism can be equated with 
spheres of influence, or dominance, with-
out the requirement for direct colonial 
conquest.11 Imperialism aside, scholars 
consider Dollar Diplomacy an element of 
the civilizing mission. Assistant Secretary 
of State Francis Mairs Huntington Wilson, 
of the Taft administration, revealed the 
Social Darwinist impetus behind the pol-
icy. Wilson explained that nature’s “rough 
method of uplift, gives sick nations strong 
macy. Samuel Flagg Bemis, in his classic 
1940s scholarship, perceived American 
imperialism of the 1890’s as an aberration. 
He explained U.S. Caribbean Basin inter-
ventions as resulting from U.S. security 
concerns, such as defending the Panama 
Canal and controlling shipping lanes. 
Modern scholars would challenge this, 
articulating that the U.S. pursued incur-
sions in a broader historical context of 
establishing a Caribbean Basin empire, at 
least informally.10 
 
Those differing perceptions of United 
States imperial designs can be somewhat 
resolved by considering different notions 
of imperialism. In the British Empire, im-
perialist projects invariably resulted in 
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By 1902, the Office of Experiment Sta-
tions at the USDA established the Porto 
Rico Agricultural Experiment Station in 
Mayagüez, a city of the west coast coffee 
region. Historian Richard Overfield dis-
tills USDA funding arguments before 
Congress: “[W]herever the American flag 
was, residents should have the benefits of 
experimentation and agricultural develop-
ments.”15 The USDA secretary sought 
hegemony over the Puerto Rican research 
agenda.16 As the stations commenced op-
erations, the leadership targeted projects 
to provide immediate assistance to grow-
ers. They focused on insect pests, for ex-
ample, but their work did not synch with 
the actual needs of the people and initially 
proved of little value; the researchers had 
not considered previous agricultural work 
in Puerto Rico. Agronomist Edmundo 
Colón would later criticize early efforts to 
acclimatize North American plants as 
mere entertainment: “It would not have 
been so bad if the species from temperate 
climates had been tried at higher alti-
tudes.” In addition to research, the station 
managed the extension service to local 
farmers until 1924. As with sometimes 
off-target research, they translated twenty
-four USDA bulletins that were more 
suited to temperate climes than the trop-
ics. Distributing thousands of bulletins 
and reports informally to leading 
“progressive planters,” their programs 
often did not reach the intended great 
masses of poor, local farmers.17 
 
Experiment Station Successes 
  
The USDA Mayagüez station, however, 
could claim some areas of relative success. 
Researchers sought to stimulate the ailing 
neighbors.”12  
 
Agricultural Development in Colonial 
Puerto Rico 
 
Excitement over the new Caribbean col-
ony washed over the American scientific 
community even before Roosevelt’s 
“Rough Riders” stormed San Juan Hill, 
the incorporation of Puerto Rico repre-
senting a rare American experiment in 
direct colonial acquisition. The technical 
journals communicated a variety of per-
spectives on Puerto Rico’s potential and 
how its agricultural resources ought to be 
developed. As medicine sought to main-
tain the health of the people to support 
the colonial project, agricultural produc-
tion would provide the foodstuffs for 
their maintenance, and perhaps more im-
portantly, an opportunity to sustain eco-
nomic development. The journal Science 
reminded of European colonizing success, 
that even Holland “depended on scien-
tific development of agriculture, forestry” 
and other industries in its colonies.13  
 
Annexation after the 1898 war created 
opportunities to export U.S. institutional 
research models to Puerto Rico. President 
McKinley’s special commissioner, Henry 
K. Carroll, in his comprehensive 1899 
Report on the Island of Porto Rico, made 
twenty-four specific recommendations, 
the final one addressing agriculture: “That 
an agricultural experiment station be es-
tablished in Porto Rico, and that the pub-
lications of the Department of Agricul-
ture be made available to the planters in 
their own language; also, that the Terri-
tory share in the Department’s distribu-
tion of seeds.”14  
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tariffs, financed largely by North Ameri-
can corporations. By 1917 sugar exports 
had grown five-fold, eclipsing coffee as 
the major export.19 The island had 
achieved an underdeveloped “colonial 
economy,” one “heavily dependent upon 
the single market of the continental 
United States,” according to historian 
Richard Overfield.20 The sugar centrales 
had quickly planted all available land and 
by that time had thus explored new cane 
varieties and fertilizers to increase yields. 
While the USDA station urged rational 
agriculture techniques, such as rotations 
with vegetable crops, the Puerto Rico 
Sugar Growers’ Association instead 
formed their own private experiment sta-
tion at Río Piedras in 1910, located near 
coffee industry, which had gone into de-
cline due to the devastating effects of the 
recent hurricane Ciriaco, exacerbated by 
Spain inflicting a high tariff after 1898, 
thus closing the vital Spanish market to 
Puerto Rico. Acquiring a coffee planta-
tion near Ponce and introducing new cof-
fee varieties from Java, Ceylon and else-
where, by 1911 research plots had quad-
rupled production over the island’s aver-
age. The journal Science reported novel 
efforts by the USDA entomologist to 
combat the coffee leaf-miner by means of 
a promising parasite, and that a botanist 
from the Connecticut State experiment 
station had temporarily relocated to study 
coffee diseases. Scientific research, how-
ever, could not solve coffee’s underlying 
economic problems. Americans preferred 
Brazilian coffee, and that South American 
supplier had been overproducing for 
some time. On the other hand, fruit farm-
ing enjoyed clear benefits from station 
research. As roads and port transporta-
tion improved under U.S. colonial author-
ity, the fruit industry expanded and grow-
ers sought advice from the USDA. The 
station had a banana plantation and nurs-
eries of mangoes and citrus by 1903. 
USDA scientists discovered that chlorosis, 
then affecting citrus and pineapple, was 
caused by excessive soil concentration of 
carbonate of lime; accordingly, experi-
ments on fertilizers quickly proceeded. By 
1911, fruit and pineapple exports surged 
to $2.1 million, a twenty-fold leap from a 
decade earlier.18    
 
The USDA station sought diversification 
of Puerto Rican agriculture, moving away 
from sugar, but that industry expanded 
rapidly given their exemptions from U.S. 
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bacco. Subsequent research determined 
globalization of agriculture to be the cul-
prit, that Javanese cane hybrids arrived in 
the Caribbean through Argentina, per-
haps via Egypt as well.23 
  
Global scientists shifted their gaze to 
Puerto Rico,  the disease epidemic only in 
that Caribbean space. The mosaic further 
engendered their fascination, it being a 
virus, one of that relatively recently dis-
covered type of microorganisms. Investi-
gators considered various factors that 
could explain the epidemic, its emergence 
particularly severe on smaller Puerto Ri-
can owned plantations, colonos, as com-
pared to the U.S. owned operations on 
the island’s east and south. World War I 
had essentially destroyed Europe’s sugar 
beet industry, driving such demand for 
cane sugar that growers often ignored 
good agricultural practices. Those actions 
weakened plant strains, a trend exacer-
bated by keeping the poorer, diseased 
stock for seed, while sending the best for 
the capital, San Juan. This station hoped 
to duplicate the private Hawaiian Sugar 
Producers’ experiment station success in 
eradicating the sugarcane leafhopper, as 
Puerto Ricans now faced the locally dam-
aging white grub. By 1914, the sugar pro-
ducers abandoned the project in failure, 
donating the station to the insular govern-
ment’s quasi-governmental Board of 
Commissioners of Agriculture. The newly 
christened Insular Experiment Station 
nevertheless continued close relations 
with the centrales.21  
 
Sugarcane and Disease 
 
The Insular Experiment Station faced a 
major challenge to Puerto Rican agricul-
ture in 1917, one that would secure to it 
respect and reshape agricultural power 
relationships on the island, and beyond. 
Station pathologist John A. Stevenson 
found leaves of sugar plants oddly mot-
tled, leading to his naming this new con-
dition the mottling disease or matizado. 
Over the coming years the disease spread 
across the island, and as mills increasingly 
refused to accept diseased cane, bank-
ruptcy afflicted a number of locally-
owned colonos.22 
  
By 1918, then director Stevenson’s re-
ports seemed desperate, with progress 
proving elusive. All cane varieties seemed 
affected, and the hereditary disease was 
passed down to new generations of cane 
grown from the diseased stalk. The dis-
ease had spread faster than planting ac-
tivities alone would suggest. One small 
step of progress was his classification of 
the condition as sugar cane mosaic dis-
ease, due to its similarity to that in to-
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tions in the cages where the insects were 
used, and no infections in the checks. I 
forced the aphis to live on the cane by 
means of thorough weeding.”27 That is, 
the twenty-four year old Chardón had 
discovered that after normal weeding op-
erations, the aphids jumped to cane for 
several hours, sufficient time to infect the 
plants with the mosaic virus. The aphid 
exposed, experts sought new resistant 
cane varieties, since the aphid could not 
be controlled. Testing canes from Java 
and Barbados, the new varieties flour-
ished, producing even more sugar than 
before. By 1924 Puerto Rico no longer 
suffered under mosaic disease threat.28  
  
Chardón viewed the increase in produc-
tion as a direct result of scientific inter-
vention. The lesson of mosaic disease was 
clear, that “every colono on the Island has 
awakened to the fact that after all, only 
science applied to crop production can in the 
end solve his problems.”29 Puerto Rican 
planters as well as politicians embraced 
Chardón’s “vision because it had pro-
duced concrete results.”30 The success of 
the Insular Experiment Station led to its 
emergence as the Latin American model 
for agricultural science. Never before had 
a Latin American nation solved a crisis in 
agriculture through scientific research. 
Puerto Rican agricultural science secured 
unprecedented  political power through-
out the Spanish Caribbean and Carlos 
Chardón would be the vehicle to wield 
that power. The American governor 
Horace Towner found in the young pa-
thologist a Puerto Rican from an elite 
family who embraced both the American 
and Spanish traditions, but more impor-
tantly, one who exhibited an impressive 
milling. Finally, in 1920 at USDA’s Mary-
land greenhouses, researcher E. W. 
Brandes discovered that the corn aphid 
had the ability to transmit the disease. Re-
searchers in Puerto Rico discounted this 
discovery since that aphid did not feed on 
cane; they instead focused attention on 
the sugarcane leafhopper.24 
 
Politics, Agriculture and Chardón 
  
Insular station mycologist Carlos E. 
Chardón would finally solve the puzzle. 
Born in 1898 and among the first genera-
tion of Puerto Rican scientists to come to 
maturity as an American colonial, he had 
proven a promising student at the newly 
established Mayagüez College of Agricul-
ture. Chardón transferred to Cornell Uni-
versity upon the devastating 1918 earth-
quake that suspended college operations. 
Upon completing his master’s degree in 
1921, he returned to Puerto Rico to as-
sume a station pathologist position.25 
Chardón conceived an elegant experiment 
to eliminate the leafhopper as culprit. He 
grew two groups of healthy cane, but one 
enclosed in a wire-mesh cage with leaf-
hoppers contained therein. Within four 
months, the exposed cane emerged 
largely infected, but the enclosed group 
remained healthy. Chardón had exoner-
ated leafhoppers as the culprit. He then 
decided to follow up on Brandes’ lead 
regarding aphids.26 Almost immediately 
upon his successful experiment, Chardón 
wrote to Nathaniel L. Britton, director of 
the New York Botanical Garden: “You 
will be interested to know that I have 
been able to transmit the sugar-cane mo-
saic by means of the [genus] aphis . . . and 
have obtained abundant secondary infec-
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Late in the previous decade of the 1920s, 
the new agricultural commissioner had 
hoped to promote the best aspects of 
North American and Puerto Rican tradi-
tions, perceiving his mission to export 
U.S. scientific knowledge to meet the ag-
ricultural, economic, social and political 
needs of Latin America. He argued that 
export agricultural problems were biologi-
cal: soil depletion, crop diseases and de-
clining yields. Scientists had the requisite 
expertise to solve these challenges. In 
short, the masters of biological practice 
should drive agricultural policy, not only 
in Puerto Rico, but throughout larger 
Latin America.34   
  
Latin America marveled at and sought to 
emulate Puerto Rico’s agricultural success. 
As a result, Chardón consulted exten-
sively with governments and agricultural 
groups in Cuba, Colombia, Venezuela, 
Panama, Peru, Ecuador and the Pan 
American Union.  He focused on two 
projects: constructing a national agricul-
tural research program in Colombia, and 
establishing Puerto Rico’s graduate school 
of tropical agriculture.35 These efforts fit 
squarely within Roosevelt’s vision.  The 
governor proclaimed the work of 
Chardón and others: “In agriculture 
Puerto Rico’s achievements have been the 
equal of those in medicine.” Roosevelt 
sought to build on those achievements, 
arguing that for North and South Amer-
ica, Puerto Rico “can serve as the con-
necting link between the two great cul-
tural divisions.” That is, “We might well 
make Puerto Rico a base for cultural and 
scientific work the influence of which 
would be felt through both continents.”36 
 
mastery of agriculture. Taken with the 
insular marvel, Towner appointed 
Chardón as Puerto Rico’s Commissioner 




Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. would extol the 
Puerto Rican agricultural commissioner 
Chardón in the pages of Foreign Affairs as 
having “done investigational and scien-
tific work of the first value.”32 Former 
University of Puerto Rico chancellor 
Thomas E. Benner, also writing in early 
1930s issues of Foreign Affairs, elaborated 
on the eminent scientist: “The services of 
Porto Rico’s commissioner of agriculture, 
Carlos A. [sic] Chardón, have been loaned 
on request to the ministries of agriculture 
of several Latin-American countries; on 
the basis of his study and advice new pro-
grams of teaching and experimentation 
have been inaugurated in the republics 
visited.”33  
 










Cornell-educated biologist Carlos E. Chardón, former insular 
agricultural commissioner, in 1931 serving as chancellor of the 
University of Puerto Rico. 
11 Journal of Global Development and Peace 
two decades earlier, had called for a “Pan-
American institution for the scientific 
study of the conditions of tropical Amer-
ica.”40 This seemed to be coming to frui-
tion with Chardón’s initiative, Science now 
declaring that assistance along “scientific 
lines” could promote international rela-
tions. “For that reason, Governor Roose-
velt hopes that the graduate tropic agri-
cultural school on the island sponsored 
by Cornell University may soon become a 
reality.”41  
  
The economic effects of the Great De-
pression impacted agricultural science in 
Puerto Rico. While the USDA station 
stood immune to local conditions, and 
the Insular Experiment Station managed 
to attract legislative funding, progress on 
the School of Tropical Agriculture 
ground to a halt. The president of Cornell 
University proved unable to secure suffi-
cient donors for the needed $1 million 
endowment.42 As a result, Chardón ad-
justed his trajectory, accepting the chan-
cellorship (rector) of the University of 
Puerto Rico.43  
    
Chardón’s experiences with the economic 
depression and in managing a university 
broadened his views on the primacy of 
scientific research as the vehicle for mod-
ernization; he now came to appreciate 
more fully the study of economics as a 
complementary consideration. Appointed 
to the Puerto Rico Policy Commission, he 
prepared a report regarding the island’s 
economic situation. As foreign sugar mar-
kets contracted and poverty increased, the 
chancellor and his colleagues developed a 
reform plan—the Plan Chardón—to diver-
sify agriculture as well as industry. Tech-
The Graduate School of Tropical  
Agriculture 
  
Chardón’s work in Puerto Rico and Co-
lombia convinced him of the need for a 
graduate school of tropical agriculture to 
train the future specialists that would 
surely be in great demand. He accelerated 
efforts in this area and, by 1926, devel-
oped a detailed proposal. The United 
States, he felt, had a moral obligation to 
train these future agricultural leaders; 
moreover, such a biologically-oriented 
Latin outreach could be more construc-
tive than, as he sardonically noted, the 
military’s clear failure “in the develop-
ment of friendly relations with Haiti, 
Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua.”37 
Chardón referred to a series of military 
interventions after the failure of Dollar 
Diplomacy in those nations. 
 
The model for this new agricultural 
graduate school would be the University 
of Puerto Rico’s highly successful School 
of Tropical Medicine.38 Just as Columbia 
University filled a critical cooperative role 
for that medical institution, he imagined 
Cornell University likewise providing 
similar support for agriculture. By the fol-
lowing year, Chardón led a high-level 
Puerto Rican delegation to Washington to 
place the proposal before the National 
Research Council’s chair for the Commit-
tee on Biology and Agriculture. The NRC 
visited Puerto Rico and embraced the 
project, declaring that the proposed uni-
versity would promote Western hemi-
spheric relations. The Puerto Rican legis-
lature authorized the school and Cornell’s 
president committed to raising funds for 
the institution.39 The journal Science, nearly 
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shift would not only provide greater agri-
cultural exports but would also increase 
food and manufactured imports from the 
U.S., with duties levied by Heureaux both 
ways to enhance his nation’s financial sol-
vency. This nascent Dollar Diplomacy 
would eventually prove unworkable 
against fierce peasant resistance. 
Heureaux’s assassination would force the 
U.S. to take direct control in 1905, perma-
nently sidelining the pariah SDIC. In the 
end, the SDIC catalyzed President Theo-
dore Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine, and led the way for the mature 
Dollar Diplomacy to take root, being fi-
nanced from major bankers, as opposed 
to management by a Gilded Age relic, an 
SDIC run more on cronyism than capi-
tal.46  
 
Washington, in the early 1890s, had origi-
nally embraced the SDIC in order to ex-
punge European influence from the Do-
minican Republic.  As long as European 
bankers owned the loans there, they exer-
cised a level of  control that flew in the 
face of  the Monroe Doctrine’s spirit. 
Much better, Washington reasoned, for a 
private American firm to own the debt. 
Americans running the SDIC could also 
help maintain close ties to the Dominican 
Republic as the U.S. negotiated for rights 
to Samana Bay. The U.S. needed this as a 
coaling station for Mahan’s new navy, es-
pecially with the Central American isth-
mus canal to the Pacific already under 
construction, though at the time in Nica-
ragua rather than Panama. The U.S. 
wanted to control the anticipated lucrative 
traffic that would flow near the island of  
Hispaniola, and have a military presence 
to help protect the canal. Outposts in 
nological recommendations, such as de-
veloping alcohol fuels from sugar, joined 
with economic proposals. The plan hav-
ing been endorsed by Franklin D. Roose-
velt’s administration, Chardón resigned as 
chancellor to assume leadership of the 
Puerto Rican Reconstruction Agency 
(PRRA), a New Deal organization. The 
PRRA worked to rebuild the fruit and 
coffee sectors, while also addressing soil 
erosion and deforestation, against a back-
drop of political resistance from the pow-
erful sugar corporations.44 Though PRRA 
success proved elusive, USDA undersec-
retary (and future Puerto Rican governor) 
Rexford Tugwell endorsed the Plan 
Chardόn and urged the Mayagüez experi-
ment station to expand its mission be-
yond Puerto Rico in order to serve the 
broader continental United States as 
well.45  
 
SDIC and the Dominican Republic 
 
Nearly a decade prior to the annexation 
of Puerto Rico, Gilded Age speculators 
Smith M. Weed and Frederick Williams 
Holls—friends of  President Glover 
Cleveland—formed the San Domingo 
Improvement Company (SDIC) in order 
to seek their Caribbean fortunes. SDIC’s 
first action: Purchase of  the Dominican 
Republic’s five-million-dollar debt in 1893 
from the Dutch. Allying with Dominican 
dictator Ulises Heureaux, the SDIC 
sought to improve the nation’s finances in 
order to pay off  the debt. Through the 
dictator, the SDIC pressed country peas-
ants, the campesinos, to abandon food 
crops in favor of  export agriculture, as 
would later occur under American tute-
lage in Puerto Rico and Cuba. Such a 
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Receivership to Dominican  
Intervention 
 
The modus vivendi operated for over two 
years before the Senate ratified its provi-
sions as a treaty in 1907. The Dominican 
Republic, during that time, successfully 
restructured its debt down to a $20 mil-
lion bond issued in the United States, 
which also supported needed public 
works. American direct investment soared 
as business interests noted the new Do-
minican Republic, one now paying its bills. 
This investment included American sugar 
firms, now benefiting under tariff and tax 
incentives codified in the 1911 Agricul-
tural Concessions Law. The island en-
joyed financial and political stability for a 
handful of years afterwards until a new 
series of revolutionary disruptions threat-
ened.49  
 
Newly elected President Woodrow Wil-
son, successor to Roosevelt’s hand-picked 
Taft, inherited the Dominican challenge 
and vigorously faced new political insta-
bilities there. The U.S. refused to accept a 
new revolutionary regime in 1913, and 
forced new elections that December. 
American pressure for increased financial 
control provoked resistance so that by 
1916 former Minister of War Desiderio 
Arias took over the city of Santo Do-
mingo in an attempted coup. To prevent 
Arias from assuming control of the gov-
ernment, President Wilson established a 
full U.S. military occupation of the Do-
minican Republic on November 26. Ab-
rogation of the 1907 treaty and refusal of 
Dominicans to reform in order to meet 
international financial obligations stood 
as the primary reasons for the U.S. action, 
Puerto Rico and Cuba’s Guantanamo Bay 
yet lie some years into the future.47  
 
The roots of  the SDIC’s demise lie within 
its structure. With its financial capital 
sources in Europe and its political power 
in Washington, the SDIC embodied a 
contradiction. Once the Dominican Re-
public defaulted on its loans in 1897 an 
international scramble occurred during 
the 1901-1904 period, leading to the U.S. 
invasion. That is, one might ignore the 
suffering caused to the Dominican people 
that the SDIC-induced restructuring had 
engendered, but Washington could not 
countenance European interventions to 
secure their principle and interest. In fact, 
Washington realized, a bit tardily, that it 
had allowed a private firm to preempt and 
usurp diplomatic channels for some years. 
Roosevelt would remove that middle-man 
with his beginnings of  Dollar Diplomacy. 
The U.S. thus established the 1905 receiv-
ership of  Dominican customs, directly 
managing the flow of  money on behalf  
of  the inept and most likely corrupt Do-
minicans. The modus vivendi applied 55% 
of  customs receipts against debt pay-
ments. Seizing these income streams 
would prevent revolutionaries from doing 
so to support insurrection. The president 
arranged for New York banks to refi-
nance SDIC debts as well as those owed 
to European creditors. The United States 
had now established a “fiscal protector-
ate” over a small Caribbean nation in ad-
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president in 1937 on an economic devel-
opment plan, which included forestry 
management. In fact, during the 1940s 
Chardón would head the National Agri-
cultural Institute of the Dominican Re-
public.54 
 
Peasants and Guerrillas 
 
Agricultural reforms, however, proved 
impossible in the eastern sugar provinces, 
where a violent guerrilla movement 
emerged in response to the occupation. 
The shift from subsistence agriculture to 
export monoculture, as demanded by the 
dollar diplomats, resulted in peasants los-
ing land to the American-owned sugar 
operatives. Unemployed and landless, 
these peasants joined the guerrilla resis-
tance. The little-reported war against the 
U.S. Marines found exasperated Ameri-
can occupation forces resorting to cruelty 
and even torture against the peasant fight-
ers. This only strengthened local resis-
tance. Ironically, the Americans could of-
fer emerging tropical agricultural expertise, 
but unfortunately the Dominicans would 
not benefit greatly from it. American oc-
cupying forces would experience similar 
frustration with insurgents nearly a cen-
tury later during nation-building enter-
prises in Iraq and Afghanistan.55  
 
Unintended consequences resulted from 
the Dominican adventure. Armed guer-
rilla resistance in the east reinforced 
mounting political pressure against the 
U.S. occupation. The negotiations over 
the eventual withdrawal in 1924 catalyzed 
a rising nationalism in the nation. At the 
same time, in attempting to prevent a re-
turn to disorder, Americans had created a 
but as the Great War approached, fear of 
German infiltration into the Dominican 
Republic also fueled American con-
cerns.50  
 
The U.S. military governed the Domini-
can Republic for an eight year period 
(1916-1924). Modest achievements could 
be claimed related to island reforms, but 
they hardly matched the extraordinary 
efforts made by U.S. military authorities 
in such areas as sanitation, education, 
property rights, taxation and agriculture. 
Agricultural reforms, in particular, fol-
lowed a “technocratic progressive” orien-
tation, including establishing extensive 
experimentation stations with which to 
integrate colonial knowledge from Ameri-
can experts who had served in the Philip-
pines, Cuba and Puerto Rico.51 Environ-
mental historian Stuart McCook observes 
that “The fusion of Cuban, Puerto Rican, 
U.S., and foreign influences made the re-
search stations distinctively creole institu-
tions.”52 More specifically, the American 
dean of the College of Agriculture and 
Mechanic Arts (Mayagüez, Puerto Rico), 
which had been in operation since 1911, 
quickly engaged in correspondence with 
Holger Johansen, an American agrono-
mist and the Dominican Republic’s new 
agricultural director. Johansen, who 
would later lead research in the Panama 
Canal Zone (as well as 1930s sugarcane 
investigations in Puerto Rico) sent some 
of his students to Puerto Rico to become 
agricultural experts, while the Puerto Ri-
can college provided graduates to work 
on Dominican projects.53 Linkages con-
tinued after the occupation, with Puerto 
Rican agricultural commissioner Carlos 
Chardón working with the Dominican 
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cipient nations would not only make 
them good consumers of American prod-
ucts, but would improve political stability 
overseas. Taft and his Secretary of State 
Knox found Roosevelt’s Dominican 
precedent of establishing customs receiv-
erships appealing, and as part of their 
Taft-Knox doctrine, they resolved to ap-
ply this solution to other nations. Taft 
thus formalized Roosevelt’s original modus 
vivendi into the doctrine of Dollar Diplo-
macy, which came to be associated with 
Taft more than any other president. In 
fact, during his last address to Congress 
on 3 December 1912, President Taft 
summarized his foreign policy as one 
concerned with commercial intercourse: 
“This policy has been characterized as 
substituting dollars for bullets. It is one 
strong local police force, the Guardia Na-
cional. Its commander, Rafael Trujillo, un-
expectedly manipulated the forces at his 
command to steal the election of 1930, 
establishing himself as dictator. President 
Trujillo sought legitimacy, but his pariah 
regime curried only disfavor and resis-
tance from the U.S. State Department. 
The advent of World War II reversed the 
legitimacy equation. Trujillo effectively 
postured as an anti-Hitler protector of 
America’s Caribbean backdoor. The U.S. 
military swung to his side, strongly sup-
porting the regime. So successful  
Trujillo’s exploitation, President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt would look beyond a 
large-scale genocide of Haitians, instead 
touting the dictator’s munificence in wel-
coming Hitler’s displaced Jewish refugees. 
Dollar Diplomacy had enabled conditions 
for America’s creation of a ruthless Carib-
bean strongman, a pattern that would oc-
cur again and again; moreover, Americans 
would then be manipulated by their mon-
sters from the Caribbean laboratory, in 
this case against Hitler, later by other des-
pots against American fears of Commu-
nism or Middle Eastern extremism.56  
 
Taft and Dollar Diplomacy 
 
William Howard Taft assumed the presi-
dency from his political ally Theodore 
Roosevelt in 1909, differing from his 
predecessor in placing greater importance 
on foreign trade than expansionism. Taft 
realized the United States economy pro-
duced more goods than it could consume 
and that foreign markets in Latin America 
and China needed to be vigorously pur-
sued for export. He believed that 
strengthening the economies of those re-
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American investors participate in Yangtze 
Valley railroad initiatives. One such pro-
ject in Manchuria—to repurchase the 
Chinese Eastern Railroad from Russia— 
only resulted in binding the formerly an-
tagonistic Japanese, Russians and Europe-
ans into an alliance to shut out the Ameri-
cans. That is, U.S. efforts to strengthen 
China’s hand actually put the Qing Dy-
nasty in a weaker position against the now 
strongly united foreign powers. Other po-
tential Dollar Diplomacy schemes in the 
Middle Kingdom came to a grinding halt 
with the Chinese revolution of 1911, es-
tablishing the Republic of China. Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson would reluctantly 
support further loans to China in 1918, 
but Dollar Diplomacy failed to elevate 
that nation. Japan remained dominant in 
Asia until World War II, much as Roose-
velt had predicted.58  
 
It can be argued that Taft’s Dollar Diplo-
macy did anticipate future American for-
eign policy. President Taft used private 
capital to foster development overseas, 
but after World War II President Harry S. 
Truman chose public capital to the same 
end. Both presidents sought to advance 
American interests by establishing stable 
governments in underdeveloped na-
tions.59 
 
Nicaragua and U.S. Imperial Rule 
 
Dollar Diplomacy had been an utter fail-
ure in Asia, but at least Taft could claim 
mixed results in Latin America. Factors 
associated with the Panama Canal 
emerged as the overriding factor in Carib-
bean affairs, and no other nation found 
itself  more impacted by this than Nicara-
that appeals alike to idealistic humanitar-
ian sentiments, to the dictates of sound 
policy and strategy, and to legitimate 
commercial aims.”57  
 
Taft attempted Dollar Diplomacy not 
only in the Caribbean, but also around 
the world in places like China, Turkey and 
Liberia. The Chinese experience proved 
controversial and unsatisfactory. Whereas 
Roosevelt had supported Japan as the 
emerging power of Asia, and a potential 
bulwark against Russian expansion, which 
in turn could also help to protect Hay's 
Open Door, Taft and Knox reversed that 
policy in favor of China. America must 
increase its financial interests in China, 
for surely that nation would take the lead 
in Asia. Taft’s administration irritated 
Europeans as the president insisted 
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property and citizens. Soon the U.S. with-
drew the majority of its Marines, but 
maintained a contingent almost continu-
ously over the next two decades, until 
1933, as a demonstrative force to help 
sustain conservative rule. While the Sen-
ate would not approve the Castrillo-Knox 
Treaty to affirm U.S. rights to military in-
tervention, by 1916 it did ratify the modi-
fied Chamorro-Bryan Treaty granting the 
U.S. exclusive rights for construction of 
an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua. This 
served American interests in preventing a 
rival canal to challenge the then-
completed Panama Canal.63   
 
Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua took on a 
different stance than in other parts of 
Latin America. Wall Street policymakers 
sought to prevent corrupt elites from 
politicizing public finances, at least in the 
U.S. view. American bankers assumed 
control of the treasury, their restrictive 
policies depriving Nicaragua of the 
“dance of the millions” that characterized 
Dollar Diplomacy elsewhere in Latin 
America. The paradoxical U.S. position 
against modernization, at least according 
gua. Once the U.S. decided in favor of  
Panama for the canal, thus abandoning 
the project in Nicaragua, the issue of  
European intervention took on a new 
complexion. The Americans could not 
accept a rival canal in Nicaragua, and 
President José Santos Zelaya’s efforts to 
do just that with the Germans (and Japa-
nese) required reigning in the recalcitrant 
leader. The outbreak of civil war at the 
east coast town of Bluefields in October, 
1909 pushed the United States into action. 
American money had financed the revo-
lutionaries, in part, and when Zelaya exe-
cuted two American mercenaries that had 
been captured with the rebels, the U.S. 
broke off diplomatic relations. Marines 
quickly landed at Bluefields to protect 
American property. Zelaya resigned to 
Mexican exile by December.60  
 
The revolutionaries assumed power 
within a year, but the U.S. would not rec-
ognize Adolfo Díaz’s conservative gov-
ernment until he had accepted an Ameri-
can receivership of customhouses and a 
new American loan to pay off British 
bankers. Unlike the Dominican Republic, 
the U.S. did not directly take over the 
government, but sent in an army of dollar 
diplomats to reform the Nicaraguan 
economy.61 The American hegemony of 
this policy could not be more evident, 
with the Banco Nacional de Nicaragua 
organized as a Connecticut institution, 
and that nation’s railroad (Ferrocarril del 
Pacifico) established as a Maine Corpora-
tion.62    
 
Revolution erupted once again in 1912, 
resulting in another American interven-
tion with 2,700 Marines to protect U.S. 
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courage paying off debt instead of financ-
ing political patronage projects, little af-
fected the non-elite agricultural producers. 
Utilizing existing waterways and land 
routes, they exported corn and cattle to 
other Central American nations, ironically 
countries benefiting from Wall Street in-
vestment. The elites suffered dispropor-
tionately from the lack of credit to sup-
port modernization, with non-elite small 
and medium growers enjoying the de-
mocratizing effect, that is, finding local 
credit sources more than satisfactory for 
their more modest needs.65  
 
The American withdrawal in 1933 had a 
similar unintended consequence as in the 
Dominican Republic. Various govern-
mental factions threatened almost con-
tinuously, but the nationalist leader Au-
gusto César Sandino actually raised a 
peasant army to resist the Americans. The 
United States had created a Guardia Na-
cional to maintain order after departure, 
but Sandino insisted it represented 
American imperialism and must be dis-
solved. The Nicaraguan president had 
placed the Guardia Nacional under a fellow 
conservative, Anastasio Somoza García, 
to the elite plantation owners from Gra-
nada, the region of the powerful, conser-
vative oligarchical coffee and sugar grow-
ers, even came to be reflected in popular 
Nicaraguan novels. The plot lines re-
vealed the villains as Wall Street bankers, 
the victims as local agro-export producers. 
The crime: Ruination and bankruptcy of 
the nation’s agricultural enterprises by 
withholding credit and refusing to sup-
port development of transportation infra-
structure, such as railroads. The United 
States had managed to convert its conser-
vative, elite supporters into anti-
Americans, virtually ready to support a 
new revolution. Further demonstrating 
Nicaraguan chafing under American stric-
tures, President Bartolomé Martinez na-
tionalized the U.S.-controlled Banco Na-
cional, a move to which the State Depart-
ment acquiesced, over bitter Wall Street 
denunciations.64    
 
The Nicaraguan Legacy of  
Unintended Consequences  
 
The scholar Michel Gobat explicates the 
unintended democratizing consequences 
of Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua. While 
true that capital-intensive oligarchical ag-
ricultural interests suffered, in fact Nica-
raguan agricultural-based economic 
growth accelerated under U.S. control 
through its withdrawal in 1933. Coffee, 
sugar and banana exports actually grew, 
but the greatest strength proved tradi-
tional agriculture, particularly cattle and 
cereal production that brought in several-
fold more revenue than the plantation 
sectors. Lack of rail and other transporta-
tion development, so negatively impacted 
by Wall Street’s restrictive policies to en-

















Graffiti pronouncement of “No more dictatorship” in Granada, 
Nicaragua.  
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sponse to Latin America, the command 
structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff es-
tablished just after the Spanish-American 
War; furthermore, in Nicaragua the mili-
tary first perfected the coordination of 
aviation assaults with ground troops, and 
Latin American guerrilla wars served to 
hone soldiers’ capabilities in preparation 
for European and Asian conflicts. 
Grandin reminds that by 1933 Americans 
invaded Caribbean nations at least thirty-
four times, but also stresses that Latin 
America proved to be the indispensible 
school of foreign policy officials. This is 
where they learned “soft power,” to use 
nonmilitary means in spreading American 
influence via cultural exchange, multilat-
eral cooperation and commerce. Presi-
dent Franklin Delano Roosevelt launched 
European and Asian diplomatic initiatives 
based upon the success of his Good 
Neighbor policy in Latin America.67   
  
The long reach of Dollar Diplomacy in 
the locations discussed—Puerto Rico, the 
Dominican Republic and Nicaragua—
tends to support Grandin’s conclusions. 
That is, American efforts to promote 
peace, development and stability faced 
tensions originating from local agency, 
global realpolitik, and unintended conse-
quences. Some lessons that might be 
gleaned from these examples: 
 
1) While Presidents Roosevelt, Taft and 
Wilson sought to shut out European in-
fluences in the Caribbean via Dollar Di-
plomacy, in the end the exhaustion of 
World War I shifted European attention 
away from the Western hemisphere, not 
American policy. Similarly, in the Cold 
War the United States strenuously sup-
who refused the request to dissolve the 
military, his power base. Somoza instead 
secretly had Sandino arrested and exe-
cuted in 1934, and within a month had 
hunted down and exterminated the liberal 
army. Somoza resigned from the Guardia 
Nacional long enough to be constitution-
ally elected president in 1936, only to re-
sume his position as military chief the fol-
lowing year. The laboratory of American 
Dollar Diplomacy had created yet another 
Latin American tyrant. The autocratic dic-
tatorship of Anastasio Somoza lasted 
over four decades until challenged by the 
Sandinista rebels, liberals who claimed 
Sandino’s heritage, but who were per-
ceived and resisted as Communists by 
American presidents Carter and Reagan. 
Remnants of Somoza’s army would be 
reconstituted as the Contras, and despite 
(illegal) arms deals with the Iranians to 
fund these “freedom fighters,” the Sand-
inistas would remain in power.66  
 
Lessons of Dollar Diplomacy 
 
New York University historian Greg 
Grandin, a Guggenheim fellow and mem-
ber of the United Nations Truth Com-
mission investigating the Guatemalan 
Civil War, argues that Latin America has 
been the proving ground for exporting 
American diplomacy around the world. 
Grandin acknowledges that recent Ameri-
can efforts to assist developing nations 
are perceived to be a continuation of 
similar post-World War II assistance to 
Germany and Japan; however, according 
to Grandin, this is all wrong. America’s 
first attempts to restructure nations oc-
curred much earlier in places like Cuba. 
The modern U.S. military formed in re-
American International Relations: Lessons from Dollar Diplomacy and Caribbean Development 
20 Journal of Global Development and Peace 
as demonstrated in colonial Puerto Rico. 
Globalized sugar cane mosaic disease 
traveled from Java through Argentina and 
possibly Egypt before creating an interna-
tional sensation in Puerto Rico. More re-
cently, AIDS and other modern human 
diseases also erupted rapidly on a global 
basis due to modern transportation net-
works. In terms of knowledge, as imperial 
powers interact with client nations they 
often disparage local knowledge. This 
sometimes has negative effects, as with 
the initially ill-conceived export of Ameri-
can agricultural practice to Puerto Rico. 
At the same time, local knowledge may be 
embraced, Carlos Chardón’s research suc-
cess against sugar cane mosaic disease 
serving as an example; however, efforts to 
globalize Chardón’s agricultural expertise 
to broader Latin America failed due to 
differing cultural practices and local con-
ditions. 
 
5) Democratizing forces, the benevolent 
goal of American imperialism, can have 
unintended, negative consequences. In 
Nicaragua, such democratizing influences 
weakened the elite, eliciting a counter-
reaction that ultimately helped destabilize 
the nation into revolution and then a des-
potic regime. As the United States inter-
acts in complex world areas such as the 
Middle East and Asia that possess a di-
verse number of stakeholders, it is critical 
to have an advance understanding of the 
interests, power relationships and vulner-
abilities of those groups. 
 
6) The eight year Dominican military in-
tervention of 1916-1924 found Ameri-
cans industriously working to improve 
education, infrastructure and institutions, 
ported anti-Communist positions and 
even wars in Central America, at severe 
human cost, only to learn the Soviets had 
not orchestrated liberal and socialist-
leaning movements to the extent imag-
ined.68 What factors are overlooked or 
overestimated in the United States today 
in relation to Asia, the Middle East and in 
modern Latin America? 
 
2) The creation of local police and mili-
tary forces as a surrogate for American 
power, with the hope of maintaining or-
der and stability, will likely be counterpro-
ductive. The National Guards in both the 
Dominican Republic and Nicaragua 
proved alluring tools for would-be des-
pots, enabling ruthless autocratic regimes 
to emerge and terrorize local populations. 
The result in such cases is often much 
worse than the original problem of insta-
bility, presenting even greater threats to 
peace and development. This pattern may 
be emerging in Iraq with local police 
forces, based on numerous reports of lo-
cal abuse. 
 
3) The chicanery of the SDIC in the Do-
minican Republic drew the United States 
into significant new roles in Latin Amer-
ica, that is, establishing a customs receiv-
ership and attempting to grow a foreign 
economy. Similarly, after World War II, 
the United States assumed a greater re-
sponsibility on a global scale, and more 
recently 9/11 changed the U.S. role yet 
again. History suggests that today’s reality 
may only be a chimera requiring rapid ad-
justment to a new paradigm at any time.  
 
4) Globalization, knowledge production 
and development are intrinsically related, 
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only to encounter fierce resistance and to 
discover upon withdrawal that their 
strongest legacy had been to breed anti-
American nationalism. Occupation, how-
ever it might be justified and whether or 
not in the interest of the “host” nation, 
can be expected to unite indigenous peo-
ples, coalescing their unity into resistance. 
While one may differentiate between reli-
gious and colonial experiences in Latin 
America and the Middle East—and de-
bate notions of nationalism in those re-
gions—the Dominican experience could 
nevertheless have helped to predict the 
insurgency the Americans experienced in 
Iraq.  
 
7) Alliances with regional leaders expose 
the United States to potential manipula-
tion. Dominican strongman Rafael 
Trujillo exploited American fears of 
Adolf Hitler, while Anastasio Somoza ex-
aggerated the Communist menace to ad-
vance his own agenda.69 In the twenty-
first century, the United States needs to 
understand the intentions of allies such as 
Pakistan and Israel as it continues the 
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